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Is All Punishment Local? 
The Effects of Jurisdictional Context on Sentence Length 
 
Abstract 
 
Objectives: This paper investigates the extent to which contextual and individual factors 
influence the length of prison sentences in California.  Methods: The analysis applies a 
hierarchical linear model to individual and county-level data.  Results: Some characteristics of 
the racial, organizational, and public safety environments are found to influence the length of 
prison terms.  Conclusions:  The findings support the organizational maintenance perspective 
and the idea of minority incarceration as a response to a perceived crime threat.  Political 
environment is not found to have a significant effect on sentence lengths, and the findings do not 
support the racial threat hypothesis.  The effects of contextual factors are more modest than 
those of individual attributes including legally relevant variables such as offense severity, prior 
record, parole status, and Three Strikes eligibility.  African-American and younger offenders 
receive longer sentences, but this effect is not found for Latinos.  Substantive, methodological, 
and policy implications are discussed. 
The Effects of Individual and Contextual Factors on Felony Sentences 
Many characteristics of criminal defendants and their offenses are known to influence 
sentencing.  A general consensus exists in the literature that legally relevant variables such as the 
severity of the instant offense and the offender’s prior criminal record should, and do, explain 
most of the variation in sentencing outcomes (Dixon 1995; Johnson 2006; Ulmer and Johnson 
2004).  Studies have also found links between criminal sentences and factors that are not directly 
relevant to the crime or the offender’s record, such as defendants’ race, ethnic origin, gender, and 
age (Engen et al. 2003; Bushway and Piehl 2001).  Along with legally relevant and extralegal 
offender-level variables, characteristics of the environments in which sentencing takes place may 
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also influence outcomes (Chiricos and Crawford 1995; Dixon 1995; Ulmer and Bradley 2006; 
Ulmer and Johnson 2004).  Furthermore, the effects of offender-level variables on sentences may 
vary systematically from one context to another (Britt 2000; Kautt 2002). 
Geographic disparity has been observed in the application of federal sentencing 
guidelines and mandatory minimum sentencing policies such as “Three Strikes and You’re Out” 
(Alschuler 2005; Bowers 2001).  Recent research has found evidence that geographic variation in 
sentencing outcomes is associated with characteristics of the local political, legal, and/or social 
environments in which sentencing takes place (Johnson 2006; Helms and Jacobs 2002; Eitle et 
al. 2002).  This paper contributes to the discussion of contextual influences on sentencing by 
using hierarchical linear models to measure and compare the influence of five theoretically-
informed categories of “inputs” that are believed to influence the process of charging and 
sentencing felony defendants.  These are (1) administrative context, (2) political environment, 
(3) local ethnic and racial demographic composition, (4) economic conditions, and (5) crime 
context.  The effects of many of the individual-level variables discussed above will be measured 
as well.  Interactions between contextual and individual-level variables are examined to 
determine whether contextual factors influence certain groups of offenders differently.   
Organizational Maintenance and Courtroom Administrative Context 
According to the organizational maintenance perspective, members of courtroom work 
groups share a common interest in the timely and efficient disposal of criminal cases, so 
administrative factors such as the size, capacity, and caseload of a court system may influence 
the sentences that these work groups hand down (Dixon 1995).  Decision makers in courts with 
heavier caseloads are likely to have less time and inclination to consider sentences outside 
“normal” ranges (Johnson 2005).  Some legal scholars observe that courtroom cultures, 
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practices, and bureaucratization associated with large court systems are conducive to more 
lenient sentencing (Eisenstein et al. 1988; Dixon 1995).  Using data from Pennsylvania, Ulmer 
and Johnson (2004) find that practical constraints such as jail capacity, and administrative factors 
such as the ratio of cases to personnel, influence the decision to incarcerate but have a smaller or 
no measurable effect on sentence length.  The effects of court size and caseload on sentence 
length are tested in this paper. 
Political Responsiveness and Electoral Accountability 
 
 California’s Superior Court judges, who try criminal cases, are elected by the public in 
the counties where they serve.  District Attorneys are also elected county officials.  Both judges 
and D.A.s make decisions that affect sentencing outcomes, but because California’s determinate 
sentencing structure strictly curtails judicial discretion, a convicted felon’s sentence is largely 
determined by the nature and number of charges initially filed by the prosecuting attorney, and 
whether the prosecutor recommends a departure from the recommended sentence for each 
charge.
1
  It seems reasonable to believe that prosecutors and judges, like other politicians, are 
motivated to respond to their constituents’ preferences as they carry out their work (Huber and 
Gordon 2004; Gordon and Huber 2002).  Furthermore, voters are likely to choose District 
Attorneys and judges whose views coincide with their own.  Because the decisions made by 
D.A.s and judges lead to enormous consequences for the lives of defendants and other members 
of society, it is important to understand the extent to which electoral incentives influence efforts 
to seek just outcomes in the courtroom. 
                                                 
1
 According to California’s determinate sentencing structure, each felony offense was associated with three 
corresponding prison terms: a “normal” sentence, a longer term to be imposed only when there are aggravating 
circumstances, and a shorter term to be applied only when mitigating circumstances were present (Judicial Council 
of California 2007; Watson 2008). 
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In the following analysis, I test the effect of the political environment on sentence lengths 
using Republican voter registration by county for 2004.  Since the 1964 Presidential campaign, 
the Republican Party has been associated with “law and order” and greater punitiveness towards 
crime than the Democratic Party (Beckett 1997; Smith 2004).  Thus, one might expect offenders 
to receive longer prison sentences in counties with a greater proportion of Republican voters if 
D.A.s and judges act in accordance with the preferences of their constituents.  Some studies find 
significant links between rates of incarceration and indicators of political context such as 
Republican Party registration, the proportion of a state legislature that is Democratic or 
Republican, and percentage voting Republican in a presidential election (Helms and Jacobs 
2002; Huang et al. 1996; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Smith 2004).  On the other hand, other 
recent research, using multilevel methods, concludes that the percentage voting Republican 
locally has no significant effect on either the odds of incarceration or sentence length (Johnson 
2005; Ulmer and Johnson 2004; Weidner et al. 2005). 
Social Control and Racial and Ethnic Threat 
 
Social and economic characteristics of the sentencing environment may also influence 
decisions and outcomes.  Critical theorists have proposed that prisons and other institutions are 
used by those who possess social and political power as instruments to establish and maintain 
social order and respond to perceived threats to that order (Foucault 1977).  Three forms of the 
social control/threat response concept (racial/ethnic, economic, and crime threat) will be tested in 
the analyses that follow. 
Researchers have found effects on sentence outcomes associated with the racial makeup 
of the jurisdictions in which sentencing takes place (Johnson 2005, 2006; Ulmer and Johnson 
2004).  Racial threat theory proposes that the effect of race on social and political outcomes in a 
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given location will vary depending on the relative sizes of the majority and minority populations 
(Blalock 1967; Myers and Talarico 1987).  In areas with small nonwhite populations, whites may 
regard their political and social power as secure, but as the minority proportion of the population 
increases, the perceived threat to existing arrangements may grow (Blalock 1967).  The marginal 
“threat” effect of minority population growth may decline when the nonwhite population reaches 
a critical mass with substantial social and political influence of their own (Blalock 1967; Britt 
2000; Taylor 1998).  Thus, the relationship between nonwhite population size and its effect on 
outcomes like sentence length might assume a curvilinear (inverse-U), rather than linear, shape. 
In addition, the criminal justice response to perceived racial or ethnic threat may be either 
targeted or broad.  Increased perception of racial or ethnic threat may result in disproportionate 
sentencing disparities for the specific group that constitutes the perceived threat (e.g. growth in 
the black population may result in disparate treatment of blacks but not whites), or sentencing 
may become more severe for all criminals.  In studies of habitual offender sentencing in Florida, 
Crawford, Chiricos, and Kleck (1998) and Crawford (2000) find that sentencing disadvantage for 
black defendants is greater in places where the black population is larger.  Others find that a 
proportionately larger African-American population is associated with greater use of prisons in 
general (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Myers and Talarico 1987; Weidner et al. 2005).  The 
following analyses will test for linear and curvilinear, targeted and broad forms of racial and 
ethnic threat effects. 
Economic and Crime Threat 
Similar reasoning suggests that the criminal justice system may be used to control a 
perceived threat posed by economically disadvantaged populations (Britt 2000).  Some studies 
detect a positive relationship between incarceration rates and unemployment rates (Box and Hale 
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1982, 1985; Chiricos and Delone 1992), though others have found that the relationship between 
the two is weak or absent (Eitle et al. 2002; Jacobs and Helms 1996).  A positive and significant 
relationship between unemployment and the incarceration rate might have alternative 
explanations unrelated to “economic threat.”  For example, unemployed people might commit 
more crimes, leading to higher rates of incarceration, or high rates of incarceration and 
subsequent release may lead to larger populations of unemployed ex-felons in certain 
neighborhoods.  Sentence length, which is less likely to be tied directly to these alternative 
explanations than incarceration rate, is used as the dependent variable here. 
A parallel “crime threat” hypothesis suggests that higher crime rates may lead to harsher 
criminal charging or sentencing in efforts by prosecutors or judges to curb crime, respond to the 
public’s demands, or fulfill their own campaign promises to “get tough on crime” (Crow and 
Johnson 2008; Ulmer et al. 2007).  This hypothesis is tested as well, using the county violent 
crime rate as an independent variable.  Finally, prominent scholars have observed that crime 
control efforts in the United States have often had disproportionate negative impacts on minority 
populations, particularly African-Americans (Tonry 1995; Kennedy 1997; Mauer 2004; Chiricos 
and Crawford 1995).  Interactions between crime rate at the county level and race/ethnicity at the 
individual level are tested to determine whether race-specific crime threat effects are present. 
Data and Model 
 
The analyses presented below are conducted using multilevel, or hierarchical, linear 
models.  The individual-level data were provided by the California Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation (CDCR).  Data are included for 93,033 male inmates from throughout 
California.  The dataset includes all male white, black, and Latino sentenced inmates housed in 
CDCR correctional facilities on August 31, 2006, who entered prison for their most recent 
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offense in the years 2002 through 2006 to serve sentences for violent, property, or drug offenses.  
The county-level data, collected separately, include political, administrative, demographic, 
economic, and crime variables corresponding to each of California’s 58 counties. 
Data were available for all inmates housed in the prison system on August 31, 2006, but 
the sample was narrowed to those who entered from 2002 to 2006 to reduce heterogeneity 
associated with changes in county characteristics and sentencing policy over the years.  Because 
the data comprise a cross-section of inmates on a specific date, individuals who entered between 
2002 and 2006 and completed their sentences before that date are omitted.  Thus, the dataset 
underrepresents the population with the shortest prison stays (between one and four years, 
depending on when they entered).  Because of a small number of extreme outliers, values from 
601 to 1200 months were truncated to 600 months.  Inmates serving life sentences are excluded 
as well.  The effect of these selection biases is to undersample the offenders who received the 
most and least leniency in the courtroom.  Therefore, estimates of sentencing disparities will be 
imperfect; actual disparities may be greater than those observed using these data. 
Ideally, a comprehensive study of sentencing would include information on offenders 
from the arrest stage forward, including those who were not incarcerated.  It would include data 
on modes of conviction, all charges filed and dropped, and rates and reasons for departures from 
the presumptive determinate sentence.  Studies that use such data have been conducted in 
Pennsylvania, Washington, Minnesota, and the federal system, which have sentencing 
commissions that collect, analyze, and share courtroom data (examples include Engen et al. 
2003; Everett and Wojtkiewicz 2002; Johnson 2005; Kautt 2002; Steffensmeier et al. 1998).  
However, this has not been possible in California, due to the paucity of publicly available court 
data coupled with a strong culture of secrecy prevalent among prosecutorial offices (Davis 2007; 
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Bibas 2006; Bandes 2006).  Analysis of available inmate data can produce substantively 
meaningful and methodologically sound findings about some aspects of sentencing, but one must 
keep in mind limitations due to the patterns of over- and under-representation discussed above. 
***Table 1 about here *** 
 
Descriptive statistics for offender-level and county-level variables are displayed in Table 
1.  The dependent variable in the model is sentence length in months, converted to natural-
logarithm form to offset the variable’s positively skewed distribution.  This variable ranges from 
8 to 600 months, with a mean of about 85 months and a median of 48 months.
2
 
Several legally relevant independent variables are included in the model.  These include 
the primary offense for which each inmate was incarcerated (dummy variables representing 23 
separate offense categories).  About 44 percent of inmates were convicted of violent offenses, 27 
percent for property offenses, and 29 percent for drug offenses.  Parole status is operationalized 
as a dummy variable coded 1 if the offender is a parolee convicted of a new offense (27 percent 
of the cases), and another coded 1 if the offender was returned to custody for a parole violation 
(13 percent), with non-parolees as the reference group (60 percent).   A continuous variable 
represents the total number of serious and violent prior convictions on the inmate’s past record 
(ranging from 0 to 94, with 72 percent having no priors), and dummy variables indicate whether 
the inmate was convicted as a “second striker” (24 percent of the sample) or “third striker” (2 
percent) under California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law.3  Extralegal individual-level 
                                                 
2
 California prisons are supposed to house individuals serving sentences of one year or longer.  Those serving terms 
of less than 12 months most likely received credit for time served in jail or are serving the remainder of a suspended 
sentence after a parole revocation.   
3
 The Three Strikes law, which went into effect in 1994, requires a doubled sentence for any felony conviction if the 
offender has one prior serious or violent offense (a “second striker”) and a mandatory sentence of 25 years to life if 
the offender has two prior serious or violent offenses (a “third striker”).  The phrase “serious or violent” refers to the 
list of approximately 40 offenses and enhancements listed as “serious” in Penal Code Section 1192.7(c) or 23 
offenses and enhancements categorized as “violent” in California Penal Code Section 667.5(c).  The “serious” list 
encompasses all of the offenses on the “violent” list, with a few minor differences. 
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variables include the inmate’s race or ethnicity and age.  Twenty-eight percent are African-
American, 43 percent are Latino, and 29 percent non-Hispanic white.
4
  One-quarter of the 
inmates are 14-24 years old, 72 percent are 25-54, and 3 percent are 55 and up.  The county in 
which the inmate’s latest conviction was adjudicated serves as the link between the individual-
level and county-level datasets. 
In the county-level dataset, measures of courtroom administrative context include dummy 
variables for small (1-20 judges in 2005) and large (100 or more judges) court systems, as well 
as the number of cases per deputy district attorney to measure caseload.  The racial and ethnic 
threat hypotheses are operationalized using the percentages of each county’s population who are 
African-American and Latino from the 2000 Census.  Centered and squared values of these 
terms are included to test whether the racial/ethnic threat effect has a curvilinear form, declining 
or increasing at low or high values of each group’s share of the population.5  To describe the 
political environment, the county dataset includes the proportion of registered voters who were 
registered as Republican in 2005.  The county unemployment rate from the year 2002 is included 
to capture the economic threat effect, and the violent crime rate from the year 2002 represents 
the crime threat.  A correlation matrix of the county-level variables found only two significant 
correlations, between the dummy variables for “small court system” and “large court system” 
(Pearson’s correlation -0.395, p < 0.01) and between “small court system” and violent crime rate 
(Pearson’s correlation -0.406, p < 0.01). 
Analysis, Findings, and Discussion 
 
                                                 
4
 Racial and ethnic categories are determined from inmate self-reports and intake officers’ observations.  Individuals 
whose race or ethnicity falls into a category other than white, black or Latino were removed from the data set.  
Asian/Pacific Islander and Native American Indian inmates were originally included, but were dropped from the 
data set because of the lack of significant findings associated with their small numbers. 
5
 To reduce collinearity between the linear and quadratic county-level African-American and Latino population 
variables, centered and squared race/ethnicity variables were calculated by subtracting the mean value of each of 
these variables from the value corresponding to each case, and then squaring the resulting term.   
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 Model 1: Unconditional Model  
 The analysis begins with an unconditional hierarchical linear model, which includes the 
natural-log of sentence length as the dependent variable, and no covariates at either Level 1 
(offender level) or Level 2 (county level).  The Level 2 variance term (τ = 0.015) is statistically 
significant (p < .001), indicating variation in sentence lengths between counties, but the 
intraclass correlation coefficient is 0.019, meaning that only 1.9 percent of the variance in 
sentencing outcome is between counties, while the remaining explainable variance is associated 
with individual-level case characteristics.
6
 
Model 2: Individual-level Effects, Legally Relevant and Extralegal 
 When individual-level covariates corresponding to legally relevant factors (number of 
serious or violent prior convictions, offense type, parole status, and second or third strike) and 
extralegal variables (race/ethnicity, age, sex, and year incarcerated) are added to the model, each 
of these covariates is statistically significant. The individual-level variance component (σ2) 
shrinks considerably, from 0.75 in the unconditional model to 0.29.  The individual-level 
covariates explain 62 percent of the within-unit variance in sentence length, as determined using 
a formula suggested by Kreft and de Leeuw (1998).
7
  The county-level variance component 
becomes even smaller (τ = 0.0067), but it is still significant (p = 0.000) indicating that the 
covariates included in this version of the model do not explain all of the county-to-county 
variation in sentence length.  About 55 percent of the between-unit variance is explained by the 
individual-level covariates.
8
  A model comparison test using deviance statistics indicates 
improvement in fit (χ2 = 89294, 32 d.f., p = 0.000) from Model 1 to Model 2.  The results of 
                                                 
6
 Intraclass Correlation Coefficient = τ00 / (τ00 + σ
2
) = 0.0148 / (0.0148 + 0.75397) = 0.01925 
7
 (Unrestricted error – restricted error) / restricted error = (0.754 - 0.289)/0.754 = 0.617 
8
 (0.0148 - 0.0067)/0.0148 = 0.547 
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Model 2 are summarized in Table 2, with antilogs of the estimated coefficients (e
β
) shown in the 
rightmost column to facilitate interpretation of each variable’s effect. 
***Table 2 about here *** 
 
 Effects of Legally Relevant Variables 
The parameter estimates associated with legally relevant variables are shown in the upper 
part of Table 2.  Offense severity and prior record are primary determinants of the punishment 
received, which is consistent with the substantive rational legal perspective (Savelsberg 1992), 
and prior scholarly research (Dixon 1995; Johnson 2006; Ulmer and Johnson 2004).   
The results from Model 2 show that in comparison to the reference group, assault and 
battery (as opposed to assault with a deadly weapon), all of the violent offenses have significant 
positive coefficients (p = 0.000), with first- and second-degree murder, rape, and kidnapping 
earning the longest sentences.  Likewise, all of the property offenses except for first-degree 
burglary (burglary of an inhabited residence) have statistically significant (p = 0.000) negative 
coefficients corresponding to average sentence lengths about 25 to 26 percent shorter than the 
average sentence for assault and battery.  Among drug offenses, average sentences for 
manufacture and sale of controlled substances are significantly longer than the sentence for 
assault and battery, possession for sale of controlled substances is not statistically significant, 
and all other drug-related offenses have significantly shorter sentences, with sentences for 
possession the shortest.  These findings appear to be consistent with the principles of 
proportionality in sentencing, reflecting prison terms commensurate with offense severity. 
The variables representing prior convictions, second- and third-striker status, and parole 
status all have statistically significant effects in the expected directions at the p < 0.001 level.  At 
the mean values of the other variables in the model, each additional serious or violent prior 
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offense on a defendant’s prior record is associated with a 3.6 percent increase in the length of the 
prison term.  Prior record is one of the criteria that judges may invoked to justify a decision to 
exceed the presumptive determinate sentence.  The effect of prior convictions is observed in 
addition to the severe penalties imposed on felons who have “second striker” or “third striker” 
status.  Offenders who are incarcerated under the “second strike” provision of California’s Three 
Strikes law earn sentences that are, on average, about 37 percent longer than they would have 
received otherwise, and those who are imprisoned for a “third strike” must serve 25 years to life, 
which is, on average, about 4.6 times longer than their sentences would be otherwise. 
Inmates returned to prison on parole violations receive 16 percent shorter sentences than 
non-parolee offenders.  This is not surprising, as parole violations often do not involve new 
felonies and violators can be ordered to complete previously suspended sentences rather than 
receiving new, full sentences.  In addition, parolees receive 2.4 percent shorter sentences even 
when they must serve new prison terms.  This may reflect their increased willingness to accept 
plea offers in comparison to non-parolees, or prosecutors’ increased willingness to offer them 
plea deals in the interest of expediency. 
 Extralegal Variables 
Along with the legally relevant variables discussed above, several extralegal variables, 
shown at the bottom of Table 2, are also associated with statistically significant differences in 
sentence outcomes.
9
  Age has a positive correlation with sentence length.  Young inmates (14 to 
24 years of age) have sentences that are about 7 percent shorter, and the oldest group (55 and up) 
have 6 percent longer sentences compared to those between 25 and 54 years of age, even when 
                                                 
9
 The variable representing year admitted has a significant negative coefficient (β = -0.206, p = 0.000), but this most 
likely reflects the sample selection bias discussed above; inmates with shorter sentences who entered in the latter 
part of the time period from 2002-2006 are more likely to remain in the data sample, while many of those who 
entered earlier had been released before August 31, 2006.  For the purposes of this analysis, the year variable serves 
as a control for underlying trends over time, but the coefficients associated with it are not substantively meaningful. 
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the number of serious and violent priors is controlled.
10
  This finding is inconsistent with existing 
research that has found a curvilinear relationship between age and both sentence length and 
likelihood of incarceration (Steffensmeier et al. 1995).  One possible explanation is that older 
offenders may receive leniency earlier in the criminal justice process, so only the worst elderly 
criminals end up behind bars.
11
  Older offenders may also have longer prior records including not 
only serious and violent offenses (which were controlled), but other offenses.  Combined with 
California’s relatively inflexible determinate sentencing structure and mandatory minimum 
sentencing policies, this may make it difficult for judges to justify sentences below the 
presumptive terms. 
Compared to whites, African-American inmates receive 6.6 percent longer sentences, 
with offense type, prior record, age, and other factors are held constant.  This finding is 
consistent with prior research conducted with data from Pennsylvania (Steffensmeier et al. 1998) 
and the federal court system (Kautt 2001-2002; Mustard 2001; Everett and Wojtkiewicz 2002).  
Disproportionalities in sentence length are probably one among many reasons why black inmates 
comprise 29 percent of the state’s inmate population, although they only make up 6 percent of 
the state’s population (Hayes 2011). 
In contrast, Latinos’ sentences were not found to differ significantly from whites’.  This 
finding is consistent with those of studies that detect greater sentencing disparities for blacks 
than for Latinos (Bushway and Piehl 2001; Demuth and Steffensmeier 2004; Chen 2008), though 
other researchers, using data from Pennsylvania, Washington and the federal court system, have 
found significant sentencing disadvantages for Latino offenders (Steffensmeier and Demuth 
2000; Engen et al. 2003; Everett and Wojtkiewicz 2002).  State-to-state demographic differences 
                                                 
10
 The same trend of longer sentences for older offenders is present when five or six age group dummies are used, 
rather than three. 
11
 The fact that only 3 percent of the data sample were 55 and older seems to support this idea. 
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may account for some of inconsistencies between the present findings and those from other 
states.   The Latino population may be large enough in California that Latinos are no longer 
perceived or treated as “minorities” in the justice system.  Latinos are not overrepresented in 
California’s prison population to the same extent as African-Americans.  They make up over 36 
percent of the state’s population (U.S. Census Bureau 2010), a greater share than in any other 
state except New Mexico (U.S. Census Bureau 2001), and about 40 percent of the male prison 
population (Hayes 2011).  Temporal differences may also matter.  The data used in earlier 
studies that find sentencing disparities for Latinos are mostly from the 1990’s.12  The Latino 
population in the United States grew 57 percent from 1990 to 2000 and another 43 percent from 
2000 to 2010, representing over half of the growth in the U.S. population (Passel et al. 2011).  As 
the Latino population continues its rapid growth, opportunities will increase for further 
examination of these conjectures. 
Model 3: Fully Conditional Model 
 Model 3 includes all of the individual-level covariates from the Model 2, and adds 
county-level and selected cross-level covariates corresponding to the hypotheses regarding 
contextual effects.
13
  The county-level covariates are dummy variables for small and large court 
systems and a continuous variable for the number of court cases per deputy District Attorney, to 
test the organizational maintenance framework; the percentage of registered Republicans to test 
the political responsiveness hypothesis; the proportions of the population who are African-
American and Latino and the squares of these terms, to test the racial/ethnic threat theory; and 
                                                 
12
 Engen, et al. (2003) use data from 1989-92, Everett and Wojtkiewicz (2002) use data from 1991-93, and 
Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000)’s are from 1993-96. 
13
 Black and Latino are estimated with random effects.  This specification is justified by the statistically significant 
variance (p ≤ 0.001) associated with the slopes for Black and Latino.  A model comparison test of the fixed- and 
random-intercepts models, using deviance statistics, confirms the choice of a model with random-effects for these 
variables (χ2 = 39.77, 5 degrees of freedom, p = 0.000). 
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the unemployment rate and the violent crime rate, to test for economic and crime threat effects.
14
  
The cross-level covariates are interactions between African-American and Latino at the 
individual level and the racial/ethnic and crime threat variables at the county level.  The results 
of this analysis are shown in Table 3. 
The coefficients associated with the individual-level variables remain almost unchanged 
between Models 2 and 3.  Only one changes by more than 0.01: the coefficient on Latino, which 
goes from -0.002 to -0.024 and becomes statistically significant (p = 0.043).  This suggests that 
Latino offenders may receive slightly shorter sentences than whites when the other factors in the 
model are controlled.   A comparison test of Models 2 and 3 using deviance statistics finds an 
improvement in fit associated with the addition of county-level and cross-level covariates (χ2 = 
79.3, 21 d.f., p = 0.000).  The level-2 variance component shrinks more (τ = 0.00482), but 
remains significant (p = 0.000).  The addition of county- and cross-level variables to the model 
explains 28 percent of the remaining between-unit variance from Model 2.
15
   
***Table 3 about here *** 
 Contextual Factors: Effects of Administrative and Political Environments 
The analysis of county-level variables yields some support for the organizational 
maintenance hypothesis.  Prior studies have found that a lower likelihood of incarceration and 
shorter sentence lengths in larger courts (e.g. Ulmer and Johnson 2004; Dixon 1995).  The results 
from Model 3 indicate that sentences tend to be about 4.9 percent longer in small court systems 
than in medium-sized systems (p = 0.041).  Small court systems are in place in about three-
quarters of the counties in California, but together they handle only about 19 percent of the cases 
                                                 
14
 All of the continuous variables are entered into the model in grand-mean-centered form.  Dummy variables are 
entered uncentered. 
15
 (0.0067 – 0.00482) / 0.0067 = 0.2806 
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filed in the state.
16
  However, sentences in large court systems are not significantly shorter than 
in medium-sized systems.  This may be due to the correlation between the small and large court 
dummies as well as anomalous characteristics of the three counties (Los Angeles, Orange, and 
San Diego Counties) that fall into the “large” category, with 100 or more judges.  When the size 
of the court system is controlled, court caseload (cases per deputy D.A.) is not significant.   
Contrary to what the political responsiveness hypothesis predicts, the analysis did not 
find significantly longer sentences in counties where the population supported the Republican 
candidate for President.  This finding confirms those of several recent studies using multilevel 
methods (Johnson 2005; Ulmer and Johnson 2004; Weidner et al. 2005; Schanzenbach 2005).  
Some prior research has found a positive relationship between political conservatism and 
incarceration rate, but the use of non-hierarchical methods on nested data may have led to 
overestimates of the effect of political environment on incarceration.  Tests of alternative 
measures of political conservatism and anti-crime sentiment, including percentage voting for 
Bush over Kerry in 2004 and percentage voting for Three Strikes in 1994 or against an 
amendment that would amend Three Strikes in 2006, produced similarly non-significant results. 
The finding that political environment has no clear effect on sentencing outcomes may 
comfort those who believe that the courts should remain separate from the influence of political 
pressures.  It may indicate that District Attorneys and judges, who run in nonpartisan political 
races in California, are relatively insulated from party politics.  The possibility remains, 
however, that effects of political context on sentencing exist despite the findings presented here.  
Some effects could be masked by the inclusion of certain control variables.  For example, in the 
model above, Three Strikes status is controlled, and both third-striker and second-striker status 
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 Calculated using 2005 data on county court caseload and personnel 
(http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof05/index.htm). 
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have strong and significant positive effects on sentence length.  Studies have discussed the 
substantial role of prosecutorial and judicial discretion in the application of mandatory minimum 
sentencing policies at the federal level and in the states (Lowenthal 1993; Bjerk 2005; Benekos 
and Merlo 1995).  Three Strikes implementation is known to vary widely from county to county 
in California (Bowers 2001; Walsh 2004), and some scholars have asserted that local political 
climate affects how individuals are charged by prosecutors under California’s Three Strikes law 
in different counties (Zimring et al. 2001).  The uniformity in sentence lengths imposed by a 
statutory determinate sentencing system may be offset in part by the exercise of prosecutorial or 
judicial discretion in the application of Three Strikes and other mandatory minimum sentences.  
The extent to which political context and other aspects of the sentencing environment influence 
the implementation of Three Strikes in California is the subject of a separate investigation by this 
author (citation omitted).  
Racial/Ethnic, Economic, and Crime Threat 
 The county-level and cross-level analyses provided no evidence to support either the 
general or race-specific racial or ethnic threat hypotheses.  Sentence lengths are not significantly 
longer for the whole population of offenders, or for blacks or Latinos, in locations where 
African-American or Latino populations are larger.  Unemployment rate also was not significant, 
contradicting the idea that punishment in the form of increased sentence length is used as a 
response to economic threat.  
The analyses of main effects (as opposed to interaction effects) did not support the crime 
threat hypothesis.  In fact, the coefficient representing the main effect of violent crime rate was 
statistically significant at p < 0.05, but in the opposite direction than expected.  This might 
indicate that prosecutors, juries, and judges are more likely to respond to crime with harsh 
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sentences in environments where violent crime is less commonplace.
17
  The analysis of cross-
level interactions does reveal evidence of race- and ethnicity-specific crime threat effects.  An 
increase in the violent crime rate is associated with statistically significant increases in sentence 
length for both African-Americans and Latinos, indicating that efforts to “get tough on crime” 
may have disproportionate effects on nonwhites.  However, these effects are small and the effect 
for African-Americans is only borderline significant: in response to a one percent increase in the 
violent crime rate per 1000 residents, we see a 1.1 percent increase in sentence length for blacks 
(p = 0.086), and a 1.5 percent increase for Latinos (p = 0.019). 
 Table 4 lists the hypotheses tested in this paper, the effects predicted by these hypotheses, 
and a summary of whether the findings confirmed the predictions. 
***Table 4 about here *** 
 
Conclusions 
 
The findings of this paper have both substantive and methodological implications for 
research on the extent and sources of sentencing disparities in the United States.  The numerous 
legally relevant factors tested in the model above explain most of the variation in sentence 
lengths, but some variation remains that can be attributed to other sources.  This study finds that 
some characteristics of the organizational and social context affect sentencing outcomes, but the 
relationships between context and outcomes are more nuanced than what “one size fits all” 
theory might predict. 
The multilevel analysis finds no evidence that measures of political context affect 
sentence lengths.  While this finding may not be substantively exciting, it illustrates a 
methodological point.  Hierarchical models allow researchers to measure the effects of case-level 
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 When a rural-urban code for each county is introduced to the model, the coefficient on violent crime is still 
negative, but no longer statistically significant (p = 0.105).  The “rural” variable itself is not significant. 
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and group-level variables simultaneously, while avoiding misspecification of standard errors due 
to ignored correlation between error terms for clustered cases (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Luke 
2004).  In earlier studies, the lack of correction for correlated standard errors for offenders 
clustered within subsets such as district court circuits may have resulted in overestimation of the 
significance of contextual variables such as those representing the political environment.  More 
recent work using multilevel methods has consistently found non-significant estimates of the 
effect of local political conservatism on sentence lengths, departure from sentencing guidelines, 
and the likelihood of incarceration (see, for example, Johnson 2005, 2006). 
While the data used in the analysis presented above are extensive, they originate from a 
single state.  Questions may arise regarding the extent to which the findings here can be 
generalized.  One could argue that research on California’s criminal justice system is intrinsically 
valuable.  California’s population comprises nearly 12 percent of the U.S. population and is 
larger than the populations of all but 32 nations (Johnson 2003).  The state’s approximately 
170,000 prison inmates constitute about 12 percent of state prisoners in the United States, and 
California’s correctional institutions house more inmates than the prison systems of most 
countries (Walmsley 2009).  In addition, the analyses here serve to extend a body of research on 
sentencing outcomes using multilevel methods that has thus far focused mainly the federal court 
system (Kautt 2002; Ulmer 2005; Johnson et al. 2008) and a handful of states with sentencing 
guidelines commissions, including Pennsylvania (e.g. Britt 2000; Johnson 2005, 2006; Ulmer 
and Johnson 2004), Minnesota (e.g. Dixon 1995; Stolzenberg and D'Alessio 1994; Miethe 1987), 
and Washington (e.g. Engen and Gainey 2000; Engen et al. 2003).  Many of the findings support 
conclusions from earlier studies using similar methods on data from entirely different sources.  
Taken together, this study and others preceding it provide strong and encouraging evidence that 
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legally relevant variables have much greater influence on sentencing decisions than extralegal 
factors.  They also confirm that geographic disparities exist that cannot be fully explained by a 
broad range of legally relevant factors.  The observation that sentence lengths for some or all 
defendants may be determined in part by county demographics, administrative characteristics, or 
other contextual factors that are well beyond the control of defendants calls into question the 
presumption of equal justice under the law.  Offenders with similar criminal records, who 
commit comparable offenses, can – and do – receive significantly different prison sentences 
depending on where which their court cases are adjudicated.   
This study and others provide evidence in support of the organizational maintenance 
framework.  Findings regarding racial and ethnic threat have been mixed, and there has been less 
support in the recent literature for the notion that political motivations contribute significantly to 
inter-jurisdictional disparities in sentence lengths.   
The absence of observed effects of political, economic, and demographic climate on 
sentence lengths may be attributable in large part to the rigidity of California’s statutory 
sentencing structure and the sentencing guidelines structures in other states where effects have 
not been found.  Scholars have written about the “hydraulic displacement of discretion” in the 
criminal justice system: when discretion is severely curtailed in one part of the system, it tends to 
resurface elsewhere (Miethe 1987; McCoy 1984; Woolredge and Griffin 2005).  This may be the 
case in California.  Due to data limitations, this study has focused on sentence length, but prior 
research has determined that much unwarranted sentencing disparity is found at earlier stages of 
the courtroom process, including the filing and dropping of charges (Shermer and Johnson 2010) 
and the decision about whether or not to incarcerate (Ulmer and Johnson 2004; Johnson 2006; 
Pardoe and Weidner 2006; Chiricos and Crawford 1995).  If detailed courtroom data become 
21 
 
available in California, future research should investigate the individual- and jurisdictional-level 
factors that influence these processes as well.  
Especially troubling is the finding that extralegal individual characteristics, such as race 
and age, influence sentencing leniency or severity beyond the extent to which they are correlated 
with legally relevant attributes of offenders and their crimes.  In particular, African-American 
offenders appear to be significantly disadvantaged.  It is uncertain whether this is due to overt or 
unconscious discrimination, institutional bias, defendants’ relative unwillingness to negotiate 
with prosecutors, or other reasons.  Although the presence of African-American sentencing 
disadvantage is well-documented, little is known about the sources of racial disparity in criminal 
charging and sentencing, and more research in sorely needed this area. 
A somewhat puzzling finding is that Latinos do not appear to experience the same 
sentencing disadvantages that African-Americans do, and that they may even receive sentences 
that are shorter than whites’ when several factors are controlled.  The reasons behind the 
apparent differences in sentence lengths between black and Latino felons in California remain 
uncertain and deserve further exploration through quantitative or qualitative research.  The 
disparities may reflect differences in criminal justice decisionmakers’ perceptions and treatment 
of blacks, whites, and Latinos, or distinctions between the groups not captured in the data used 
here, such as differences in plea bargaining patterns.   
Policy Implications 
Some proponents of criminal justice reform, including California Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger (2009) and the Little Hoover Commission (2007), an independent and 
bipartisan state oversight agency, have called for the creation of a sentencing commission 
consisting of experts, policy makers, and elected officials to review sentencing data, proposals, 
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policies, and outcomes.  Others suggest that more structured presumptive sentencing guidelines 
may increase uniformity in sentencing (Hayes 2006), though evidence from Pennsylvania and 
the federal courts indicates that such a system may be insufficient to eliminate geographic 
disparity in sentencing (Johnson 2006; Johnson et al. 2008).  Critical legal scholars have called 
for greater transparency in prosecutorial and judicial decision-making and the allocation of more 
resources and energy to careful study and systematic analysis of criminal justice processes and 
outcomes to reduce sentencing disparities, especially those associated with race (Bandes 2006; 
Davis 2007).  Increased availability of detailed criminal justice data from the courts, including 
information about prosecutors’ decisions to file or drop charges and to negotiate plea deals, 
could shed light on sources of interjurisdictional variation in sentencing outcomes as well as on 
racial and ethnic disparities.  The need for proposals like these to be considered seriously is 
confirmed by the findings of this study.
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
  
Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Individual-level Variables (N = 93033)         
Sentence Length in Months (truncated past 600 
months) 
8 600 85.36 104.09 
Offense Categories     
1st degree murder 0 1 0.02 0.13 
2nd degree murder 0 1 0.02 0.15 
Manslaughter 0 1 0.02 0.12 
Vehicular Manslaughter 0 1 0.00 0.07 
Robbery 0 1 0.11 0.32 
Assault with a deadly weapon 0 1 0.08 0.28 
Rape 0 1 0.09 0.29 
Lewd act with a child 0 1 0.01 0.10 
Kidnapping 0 1 0.05 0.22 
(Reference = other assault) 0 1 0.01 0.09 
Burglary - 1st degree 0 1 0.04 0.20 
Burglary - 2nd degree 0 1 0.05 0.22 
Grand theft 0 1 0.02 0.15 
Petty theft with a prior 0 1 0.04 0.19 
Receiving stolen property 0 1 0.03 0.18 
Vehicle theft 0 1 0.06 0.23 
Forgery or fraud 0 1 0.02 0.14 
Possession of controlled substances 0 1 0.12 0.32 
Possession of controlled substances for sale 0 1 0.10 0.30 
Sale of controlled substances 0 1 0.04 0.20 
Manufacture of controlled substances 0 1 0.01 0.10 
Possession of marijuana for sale 0 1 0.01 0.08 
Marijuana sales 0 1 0.00 0.06 
Number of serious or violent prior convictions 0 94 0.50 1.27 
Second Striker 0 1 0.24 0.43 
Third Striker 0 1 0.02 0.12 
New prison admission (non-parolee) 0 1 0.60 0.49 
Current offense charged as a parole violation 
with new prison term 
0 1 0.27 0.44 
Parolee - returned to custody 0 1 0.13 0.33 
 
(continued on next page)
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Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Black/African-American 0 1 0.28 0.45 
Hispanic/Latino 0 1 0.43 0.49 
White 0 1 0.29 0.45 
Age 14-24 0 1 0.25 0.43 
Age 25-54 0 1 0.72 0.45 
Age 55 and up 0 1 0.03 0.17 
Year of incarceration 2002 2006 2004.93 1.23 
2002 0 1 0.07 0.25 
2003 0 1 0.09 0.29 
2004 0 1 0.27 0.45 
2005 0 1 0.27 0.45 
2006 0 1 0.44 0.50 
County-Level Variables (N = 58)         
Percentage of Republican registered voters 11.54 51.80 38.91 9.42 
Caseload per Deputy D.A. 2.00 186.85 76.63 42.07 
Small Court System (1-20 judges) 0 1 0.74 0.44 
Medium-sized system (21-99 judges) 0 1 0.21 0.41 
Large Court System (100 or more judges) 0 1 0.05 0.22 
Unemployment Rate 4.60 15.00 7.64 2.39 
% African-American 0.16 14.93 3.40 3.56 
% Latino 3.97 72.22 22.94 15.25 
% White 48.71 94.18 72.74 13.74 
Violent Crime Rate 182.40 912.90 429.49 174.12 
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Table 2:  Model with Individual-level Variables Only: Dependent variable = ln (sentence in 
months) 
 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
P-
value e
β
 
Intercept 417.033 3.392 0.000 1.30E+181 
Legally Relevant Variables 
    Offense Categories 
    1st degree murder 1.914 0.015 0.000 6.778 
2nd degree murder 1.323 0.013 0.000 3.754 
Manslaughter 0.906 0.015 0.000 2.475 
Vehicular Manslaughter 0.551 0.026 0.000 1.736 
Robbery 0.386 0.007 0.000 1.472 
Assault with a deadly weapon 0.282 0.008 0.000 1.326 
Rape 0.847 0.018 0.000 2.333 
Lewd act with a child 0.543 0.010 0.000 1.722 
Kidnapping 0.801 0.021 0.000 2.229 
(Reference = other assault) 
    Burglary - 1st degree 0.197 0.010 0.000 1.217 
Burglary - 2nd degree -0.345 0.009 0.000 0.708 
Grand theft -0.346 0.013 0.000 0.708 
Petty theft with a prior -0.420 0.010 0.000 0.657 
Receiving stolen property -0.384 0.011 0.000 0.681 
Vehicle theft -0.307 0.009 0.000 0.735 
Forgery or fraud -0.284 0.014 0.000 0.753 
Possession of controlled substances -0.453 0.007 0.000 0.635 
Possession of controlled substances for sale 0.008 0.007 0.256 1.008 
Sale of controlled substances 0.179 0.010 0.000 1.196 
Manufacture of controlled substances 0.388 0.019 0.000 1.475 
Possession of marijuana for sale -0.510 0.022 0.000 0.601 
Marijuana sales -0.188 0.029 0.000 0.829 
Number of serious or violent prior convictions 0.035 0.002 0.000 1.036 
Second Striker 0.318 0.005 0.000 1.374 
Third Striker 1.517 0.015 0.000 4.558 
(Reference = no "strikes") 
    Current offense charged as a parole violation 
with new prison term -0.025 0.004 0.000 0.976 
Parolee - returned to custody -0.179 0.006 0.000 0.836 
(Reference = non-parolee) 
     
(continued on next page)
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 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
P-
value eβ 
Extralegal variables 
    Black 0.064 0.005 0.000 1.066 
Latino -0.002 0.005 0.660 0.998 
Age 14-24 -0.070 0.004 0.000 0.933 
(Reference = 25-54) 
    Age 55 and up 0.055 0.011 0.000 1.056 
Year admitted -0.206 0.002 0.000 0.814 
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Table 3:    Model with Individual-level, County-level, and Cross-level Variables: Dependent 
variable = ln (sentence in months) 
 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
P-
value eβ 
Intercept 416.700 3.391 0.000 9.34E+180 
County-level Variables 
    Political context 
    Percentage of Republican registered voters 0.001 0.001 0.361 1.001 
Administrative Context 
    Caseload per Deputy D.A. (x10) -0.002 0.000 0.305 0.998 
Small Court System (1-20 judges) 0.049 0.023 0.041 1.051 
(Reference = Medium-sized system (21-99 
judges) 
    Large Court System (100 or more judges) -0.005 0.042 0.914 0.995 
Economic Threat 
    Unemployment Rate -0.002 0.005 0.738 0.998 
Racial/Ethnic Threat 
    % African-American -0.005 0.005 0.302 0.995 
(% African-American)
2
 0.002 0.001 0.035 1.002 
% Latino 0.001 0.001 0.496 1.001 
(% Latino)
2
 0.000 0.000 0.535 1.000 
Crime Threat 
    Violent Crime Rate (crimes / 1000 residents) -0.164 0.000 0.043 0.849 
Individual-level Variables 
    Legally Relevant Variables 
    Offense Categories 
    1st degree murder 1.913 0.015 0.000 6.771 
2nd degree murder 1.323 0.013 0.000 3.754 
Manslaughter 0.907 0.015 0.000 2.476 
Vehicular Manslaughter 0.553 0.026 0.000 1.738 
Robbery 0.387 0.007 0.000 1.472 
Assault with a deadly weapon 0.282 0.008 0.000 1.326 
Rape 0.849 0.018 0.000 2.336 
Lewd act with a child 0.544 0.010 0.000 1.723 
Kidnapping 0.801 0.021 0.000 2.228 
(Reference = other assault) 
     
(continued on next page)
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 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
P-
value eβ 
Burglary - 1st degree 0.197 0.010 0.000 1.217 
Burglary - 2nd degree -0.345 0.009 0.000 0.708 
Grand theft -0.346 0.013 0.000 0.708 
Petty theft with a prior -0.420 0.010 0.000 0.657 
Receiving stolen property -0.383 0.011 0.000 0.682 
Vehicle theft -0.307 0.009 0.000 0.736 
Forgery or fraud -0.284 0.014 0.000 0.753 
Possession of controlled substances -0.453 0.007 0.000 0.636 
Possession of controlled substances for sale 0.009 0.007 0.243 1.009 
Sale of controlled substances 0.178 0.010 0.000 1.195 
Manufacture of controlled substances 0.391 0.019 0.000 1.478 
Possession of marijuana for sale -0.511 0.022 0.000 0.600 
Marijuana sales -0.189 0.029 0.000 0.827 
Number of serious or violent prior convictions 0.035 0.002 0.000 1.036 
Second Striker 0.318 0.005 0.000 1.374 
Third Striker 1.516 0.015 0.000 4.555 
(Reference = no "strikes") 
    Current offense charged as a parole violation 
with new prison term -0.024 0.004 0.000 0.976 
Parolee - returned to custody -0.179 0.006 0.000 0.836 
(Reference = non-parolee) 
    Extralegal variables 
    Black 0.054 0.013 0.000 1.055 
Latino -0.024 0.012 0.043 0.976 
Age 14-24 -0.070 0.004 0.000 0.932 
(Reference = 25-54) 
    Age 55 and up 0.055 0.011 0.000 1.056 
Year admitted -0.206 0.002 0.000 0.814 
Cross-level Interactions 
    Black x % African-American 0.001 0.004 0.710 1.001 
Black x (% African-American)
2
 -0.001 0.001 0.248 0.999 
Black x Violent Crime Rate (per 1000 residents) 0.011 0.000 0.086 1.011 
Latino x % Latino 0.000 0.001 0.622 1.000 
Latino x (% Latino)
2
 0.000 0.000 0.427 1.000 
Latino x Violent Crime Rate (per 1000 residents) 0.015 0.000 0.019 1.015 
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Table 4: Summary of Findings 
 
Variable and Corresponding Hypothesis 
 
Predicted effect Confirmed? 
“Legally relevant” defendant characteristics 
will play a substantial role in sentence 
outcomes (substantive rationality) 
 
(+) effects for violent 
offenses, number of 
priors, offense 
severity, 2
nd
 or 3
rd
 
strikers; (-) effects for 
property offenses, 
parolee status  
 
Yes, all legally relevant 
variables have strong 
significant effects as 
expected 
African-American offenders will receive 
longer sentences than whites (substantive 
rationality) 
 
(+) effect for Black Yes 
Latino offenders will receive longer 
sentences than whites (substantive 
rationality) 
 
(+) effect for Latino No 
Sentences will be longer in counties with a 
higher percentage of Republican voters 
(political responsiveness)  
 
(+) effect for % 
Republican 
No 
Longer sentences will be administered in 
smaller court systems (organizational 
maintenance) 
 
(+) effect for small 
court system 
Yes 
Shorter sentences will be administered in 
larger court systems (organizational 
maintenance) 
 
(-) effect for large 
court system 
No 
Courts with higher caseloads will administer 
shorter sentences (organizational 
maintenance) 
 
(-) effect for court 
cases per D.A. 
No 
In areas where the black population is 
larger, sentences will be longer (racial threat, 
general); effect may diminish where black 
share of the population is high (racial threat) 
 
(+) effect for  
% Black in county; (-) 
effect for  
(% Black)
2
 
No 
In areas where black population is larger, 
black defendants will receive longer 
sentences, and the effect will be curvilinear 
(racial threat, specific) 
 
(+) effect for (Black * 
% Black; (-) 
coefficient on [Black 
* (% Black)
2
] 
 
No 
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Variable and Corresponding Hypothesis 
 
Predicted effect Confirmed? 
In areas where the Latino population is 
larger, sentences will be longer (ethnic 
threat, general); effect will diminish where 
Latino share of the population is high. 
 
(+) effect for  
% Latino in county;  
(-) effect for  
(%  Latino)
2
 
No 
In areas where the Latino population is 
larger, Latinos will receive longer sentences, 
and the effect will be curvilinear in form 
(ethnic threat, specific) 
(+) effect for (Latino 
* % Latino; (-) 
coefficient on [Latino 
* (% Latino)
2
] 
 
No 
Economic threat: sentences will be longer 
where the unemployment rate is higher. 
 
(+) effect for county 
unemployment rate 
No  
 
Crime threat: sentences will be longer where 
the crime rate is higher. 
 
(+) effect for county 
crime rate 
No effect for whites; 
borderline significant 
(+) effect for blacks; 
significant (+) effect for 
Latinos 
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